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Hire-Purchase Agreements: the
Unfortunate Triumph of Form
over Function
Nicholas Curwen
Introduction
The doctrine of freedom of contract requires that the form of
the agreement, that is, the words used by the parties, should be
upheld. This doctrine can be tested to its limits where a contractor
with dominant negotiating power tries to hide the true function of
the agreement in order to avoid the unwelcome effect of particular
legal rules. All sorts of shams and pretences have been used to try
and pull the wool over the courts' eyes. Yet, English courts require
compelling evidence before they are prepared to depart from the
apparent form of the agreement in favour of a construction that
upholds the substance or function of the agreement.
A notable example of an artificial form, suppressing the real
purpose of an agreement, is the hire-purchase contract. In the
standard scenario a prospective purchaser wants to buy goods on
credit from a retailer. The retailer is not prepared to extend credit, so
they sell the goods to a finance company, which in tum extends
credit to the "purchaser". The credit transaction is structured as a
hiring, requiring the debtor to make regular hire payments to the
finance company for an agreed term. In addition, the debtor has an
option to purchase the goods so long as all hire charges have been
paid. The hire payments are much greater than normal hire payments
because in reality they reflect part payment of the purchase price,
which is confirmed by the fact that the option to purchase is
exercisable upon payment of a nominal sum. The economic function
of a hire-purchase agreement is a sale financed by a secured loan,
but it takes the legal form of a hiring with an option to purchase. The
reason why finance companies adopt this strange form for their
credit agreements is to ensure that, if the hirer wrongfully sells the
goods to an unsuspecting third party, the latter will not be protected
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by the nemo dat exception found in s 9 of the Factors Act 1889. 1 In
Helby v Matthewi the House of Lords sided with the finance
company and held that hire-purchase agreements should be taken at
their face value. These agreements were not to be construed as
conditional sales; so, s 9 of the 1889 Act did not apply. Furthermore,
in the contemporaneous case of McEntire v Crossley Bros Ltd,3 their
lordships held that the finance company had simply reserved
ownership and did not, therefore, have a registrable mortgage.
The unreality of this approach has prompted repeated calls for
the reform of hire-purchase agreements to take account of their true
economic function. 4 The lower courts, however, have gone someway
towards mitigating the full effect of these precedents by coming to
the aid of a stranger who innocently acquires the hired goods from
the hirer. Were the finance company permitted to sue the stranger in
conversion for the full value of the goods, the finance company
would reap a windfall if most of the hire charges had been paid.
Accordingly, the courts have insisted that the finance company is
limited to recovering no more than their loss, which is usually
deemed to be the balance outstanding under the hire-purchase
agreement. The purpose of this article is to examine the techniques
used by the courts to limit the finance company's damages in such
cases, and will conclude that all of the techniques used are
illegitimate, thereby reinforcing the need for reform.
The House of Lords favours form over function
In Helby v Matthews a piano was let on hire-purchase terms,
the consideration payable by 36 monthly instalments. The hirer had
1 The relevant parts of s 9 provide that: "Where a person, having bought or agreed to buy goods,
obtains with the consent of the seller possession of the goods ... the delivery or transfer, by that person
... of the goods ... under any sale, pledge or other disposition thereof ... to any person receiving the
same in good faith and without notice of any ... right of the original seller in respect of the goods, shall
have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were a mercantile agent in
possession of the goods ... with the consent of the owner."
2 [1895] AC 471.
3 [1895] AC 457. The agreement did not seem to confer on the "hirer" a right of premature termination
and there was no separate option to purchase. It, therefore, seems that it was a conditional sale but the
decision is as valid for hire-purchase agreements as for conditional sales.
4 See J S Ziegel, "Hire-Purchase Agreements: A Plea for Greater Realism", (1960) 104 SJ996; J W A
Thomley and J S Ziegel, "Hire-Purchase Reformed", [1965] CLJ 59; R M Goode, Hire-Purchase Law
and Practice, 2"d edn (Butterworths: London,1970), p 47; and The Crowther Committee Report on
Consumer Credit (Cmnd 4596, 1971), para 5.2.2.
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the option of returning the piano at any time, in which case they
would not be liable for any future instalments. If all instalments were
duly paid, the hirer would then become the owner. Having paid no
more than five of the monthly instalments, the hirer pledged the
piano with the defendant. When sued by the owner, the defendant
pleaded in aid s 9 of the Factors Act 1889. The House of Lords held
that a hirer under a hire-purchase agreement was not a person who
had "bought or agreed to buy" the goods and, so, s 9 did not protect
the defendant.
Lord Macnaghten did not regard the agreement as a sham,
which he emphasised by saying:
The advantages are not all on one side. If the object of
desire loses its attractions on closer acquaintance - if
faults are developed or defects discovered - if a coveted
treasure is becoming a burden and an encumbrance it is
something, surely, to know that the transaction may be
closed at once without further liability and without the
payment of any forfeit. If these agreements are
objectionable on public grounds it is for Parliament to
interfere. It is not for the Court to put a forced or
strained construction on a written document or to import
a meaning which the parties never dreamed of because it
may not wholly approve of transactions of the sort.5
In subsequent cases the lower courts have displayed a
somewhat schizophrenic approach. In contests between the finance
company and the hirer the courts have adhered strictly to precedent
and permitted the finance company to recover the goods and have
refused to give credit to the hirer for the fact that they have paid
most of the "purchase" price. Kelly v Lombard Banking Co Ltd. 6 is a
notable example. In that case the plaintiff took a car on hire-
purchase terms for a total price of just over £534. The initial
payment of just over £186 was expressed to be in consideration for
5 [1895] AC 471, P 482. Modern hire-purchase agreements rarely give the hirer such advantageous
rights of termination. Ss 99 and 100 of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 give a hirer under a regulated
hire-purchase agreement the right to terminate the agreement without further liability provided that at
least one half of the total "price" has been paid. Finance companies acknowledge this overriding
stipulation by usually including a similar provision in their regulated hire-purchase agreements.
6[1959]1 WLR41.
23
the option to purchase, which could be exercised on payment of a
further fee of £1 provided that all hire payments had been made.
Having paid in excess of £419, the plaintiff could not complete the
payments. So, the finance company recovered the car. The hirer sued
them for the return of the initial payment of £186 as representing a
total failure of consideration. The Court ofAppeal rejected his claim
because they held that the ability to buy the car was a valuable right
and could not be exercised until the hirer had paid all hire
instalments. Lord Denning said: "I see the hardship on the hirer. I
often think it is hard under these hire-purchase agreements when the
hirer has parted with his money and the finance company takes both
the car and the money: but there is the law."? However, in contests
between the finance company and a third party, who has acquired the
goods from the hirer, the courts have endeavoured to prevent the
finance company from recovering the value of the goods. Instead,
the finance company is limited to recovering their loss, which is
usually deemed to be the balance outstanding under the hire-
purchase agreement with the hirer.
The finance company suing a third party in conversion
In their attempt to limit the damages recoverable by a finance
company from an innocent purchaser of the hired goods the lower
courts have adopted at least three distinct strategies, using,
respectively, rules founded on contract law, property law and tort
law. First, the hirer could be regarded as having assigned their
contractual rights to the innocent purchaser, enabling the latter to
assert those rights, including the option to purchase, against the
finance company. Second, the finance company could be deemed to
have only a limited proprietary interest in the goods and, hence, to
be able only to recover the value of that interest (namely, the unpaid
balance under the hire-purchase agreement) in a conversion action.
Third, the finance company's cause of action could be regarded as
governed by the usual rules of tort law and, hence, recovery limited
to the actual loss suffered by the claimant, that is, either the unpaid
balance under the hire-purchase agreement or the full value of the
goods, whichever was the less. However, none of these approaches
has been supported by convincing reasoning.
7 Ibid, P 44.
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1. Assignment of contractual rights by the hirer
In Whiteley Ltd v Hill the plaintiffs let a piano on hire-
purchase terms to Miss Nolan, who used it in her flat. Without
paying off all charges under the agreement, she sold her flat and its
contents to the defendant. She gave the defendant a receipt, in which
she stated: "I solemnly declare that the property is my own and that
no one has any claim upon it." The owners of the piano then
commenced an action against the defendant for the return of the
piano or its value. The defendant was only prepared to pay the
outstanding balance under the hire-purchase agreement, which was a
lesser sum than the piano's value. All three members of the Court of
Appeal thought that the original hirer's option to purchase had been
assigned to the defendant, which enabled the defendant to pay the
outstanding balance and exercise the option to purchase against the
owner. Both Swinfen Eady M.R. and Warrington LJ regarded it as an
equitable assignment9 but failed to explain how it had been achieved.
They seemed to assume that the sale of the piano assigned the hirer's
contractual rights, but that could only be achieved by following the
rules regulating the assignment of chases in action rather than the
rules regulating the contractual transfer of ownership.
It is well understood that, whereas the equitable assignment of
the benefit of a contract needs no written formalities, there must, at
least, be evidence of an intention to assign that benefit. 10 In Whiteley
v mIt it is difficult to find that intention. The problem lies in the
wording ofthe receipt signed by the hirer and given to the defendant.
The hirer declared that the property belonged to her and that no one
else had any claim upon it. Far from assigning the benefit of the
hire-purchase contract, the hirer was desperately trying to suppress
it; she had to do that in order to support the charade that it was hers
to sell. As the facts do not support an equitable assignment of the
hirer's option to purchase the piano, it is difficult to see how the
defendant acquired the right to exercise that option.
The simple expedient of inserting a clause in the hire-purchase
8 [1918]2 KB 808.
9 It could not have been a legal assignment because it did not satisfy the requirements concerning
writing and notice, contained in s 25(6) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873. That provision is
now to be found in the Law of Property Act 1925, s 136.
10 See William Brandt's Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co [1905] AC 454.
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contract prohibiting any assignment of the contact by the hirer
should prevent strangers from ever acquiring the option to purchase.
Third parties who acquired the goods could not then use the option
as a way of reducing the damages payable when sued by the owner
for the return of the goods. The House of Lords decision in Linden
Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd I makes it clear
that a prohibition against the assignment of contractual benefits must
be upheld. In view of the almost universal prohibition against
assignment, contained in modem hire-purchase agreements, this
method of limiting the finance company's damages will work no
longer. An alternative approach towards helping the innocent buyer
is to concentrate on the finance company's proprietary interest in the
goods.
2. Limiting the finance company's proprietary interest in
the goods
The possibility that the finance company and the hirer may
each have limited proprietary interests in the goods was explored by
Denning LJ in Wickham Holdings Ltd v Brooke House Motors Ltd. 12
In that case a car was let on hire-purchase terms by a finance
company for a total price of £889. When the outstanding balance had
been reduced to £274, the hirer wanted to trade it in with a dealer in
part-exchange for another car. The dealer got in touch with the
finance company and was told by them that £274 was the settlement
figure but that they would accept £270, if paid within seven days.
The hirer duly sold the car to the dealer who in tum re-sold it.
However, the dealer forgot to send the "settlement" cheque to the
finance company. Not long afterwards the finance company found
out what had happened and sued the dealer in conversion for the
value of the car (£415) plus damages for detention. Not surprisingly,
the Court of Appeal disliked the idea of the finance company
recovering the full market value of the car when the outstanding
balance under the hire-purchase agreement was far less. How, then,
to deny them? The majority, Dankwerts and Winn LJJ, held that the
finance company was estopped from denying that they would accept
£274 in settlement and, therefore, that was the measure of their loss.
"[1994] AC 85.
12 [1967] 1 WLR 295.
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Denning LJ doubted that there was an estoppel because the money
had to be paid within a reasonable time and it had not. This seems to
be the better view. However, he found another way of limiting the
damages to the amount outstanding under the hire-purchase
agreement rather than the value of the car. He regarded the finance
company as having a limited proprietary interest in the car and the
value of that interest was the balance outstanding under the hire-
purchase agreement. He explained himself as follows:
I am well aware, of course, that prima facie in
conversion the measure of damages is the value of the
goods at the date of the conversion. But that does not
apply where the plaintiff, immediately prior to the
conversion, has only a limited interest in the goods: see
Edmondson v Nuttall, 13 per Willes 1. Take this case. The
hirer had a most valuable interest in the car. He had paid
already £615 lOs towards the purchase price and had the
right to buy it outright on paying another £274 lOs. The
interest of the finance company was limited
correspondingly. Its interest was limited to securing the
payment of the outstanding £274 lOs. It is entitled to be
compensated for the loss of that interest, and no more. 14
He continued:
In a hire-purchase transaction there are two proprietary
interests, the finance company's interest and the hirer's
interest. If the hirer wrongfully sells the goods or the
benefit of the agreement, in breach of the agreement,
then the finance company are entitled to recover what
they have lost by reason of his wrongful act. That is
normally the balance outstanding on the hire-purchase
price; but they are not entitled to more than they have
lost. 15
This sits uneasily with his lordship's comments in Kelly v
13 (1864) 17 CB (N.S.) 280.
14 [1967] 1 WLR. 295, pp 299-300.
15 Ibid, pp 300-301.
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Lombard Banking Co, noted above. 16 If the finance company has a
limited proprietary interest in the goods, measured by the extent of
the hirer's indebtedness, then why was the finance company, in Kelly
v Lombard Banking Co, permitted to recover the goods and keep all
"hire" payments? It also seems to fly in the face of the decisions of
the House of Lords in Helby v Matthews and McEntire v Crossley.
As we have seen, in those cases it was decided that the finance
company did not have a mortgage or a charge and that the regular
"hire" instalments paid by the hirer were consideration for hiring the
goods; they were not consideration for purchasing them. If the
finance company does not have a limited proprietary interest in the
goods, it might be argued that, nonetheless, the hirer has a limited
proprietary interest. Let us now examine that possibility by, first,
considering whether the hirer's option to buy is a species of
equitable proprietary interest.
(a) The hirer's interest as equitable property
Fleming was of the 0pllllOn that, under a hire-purchase
agreement, the hirer has a property right in the chattel, not only in
the limited sense of the "special property" vested in all bailees, but
by reason of his prospective "general" ownership that will vest in
him on exercise of his option to purchase or eventual payment of the
full purchase price. 17 Fleming's reference to the hirer's "prospective"
ownership was no doubt prompted by analogy with equity's
treatment of land options. Equity, however, does not treat land and
goods in the same way. Options to purchase land are proprietary
interests from the moment the option is granted l8 because equity
regards land as unique. Accordingly, if the grantor of the option fails
to respond to the grantee's exercise of the option, damages are
regarded as an inadequate remedy. Equity will then grant an order of
specific performance. The prospective entitlement to specific
performance gives the grantee of the option an immediate equitable
proprietary interest in the land under a constructive trust because
equity treats as done that which ought to be done.
Most goods are not unique and, so, equity will rarely grant
16 See the text referred to at fn 7 ahove.
17 John Fleming, "Tort Liability for Damage to Hire-Purchase Goods", (1958) 32 Austr U267, 270.
18 See London and South Western Railway Co v Gomm (1882) 20 Ch D 562.
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specific performance in support of an option to purchase goods. In
any event specific performance is not required in the context of
options to buy goods in order to vest ownership in the buyer. The
vendor of an estate in land must execute a deed in favour of the
purchaser before the latter can acquire legal title. A decree of
specific performance compels the vendor to execute the deed. The
hirer with an option to purchase goods acquires ownership, not by
conveyance, but by their own unilateral act of paying all hire charges
and tendering payment in exercise of the option to purchase. It
requires no further act by the finance company to accomplish the
desired transfer of ownership. Hence, specific performance is
redundant and cannot, therefore, generate a constructive trust in
favour of the hirer. If the hirer does not have an equitable proprietary
interest, they may yet have a legal proprietary interest.
(b) The hirer's interest as legal property
In On Demand Information pIc v Michael Gerson (Finance)
pIc both the Court of Appeal 19 and the House of Lords20 held that a
hirer under a finance lease of goods had a property interest in the
goods. However, neither court was clear about the nature of that
interest. By contrast, in Helby v Matthews Lord Macnaghten
observed:
... it was the intention of the parties - an intention
expressed on the face of the contract itself - that no one
of those monthly payments until the very last, should
confer upon the customer any proprietary right in the
piano or any interest in the nature of a lien or any
interest of any sort or kind beyond the right to keep the
instrument and use it for a month to come.21
These apparently conflicting views can in fact be reconciled.
To do so requires an analysis that regards ownership as a divisible
interest in goods, a view prompted by the historical development of
the action in conversion.
19 [2001] 1 WLR 155.
21l [2002] 2 WLR 919.
21 [1895]AC471,p481.
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In Gordon v Harper22 it was decided that, upon the creation of
a hiring, the goods having been delivered to the hirer, the owner
could not sue strangers in conversion for wrongful interference with
the goods. The claimant in conversion needed both property in the
goods and the right to their immediate possession?3 Now clearly the
owner, whose goods are out on hire, retains ownership in the goods
but the owner does not have the right to the immediate possession of
them. That right to possession is not a mere contractual right because
conversion protects a proprietary interest in goods?4 If the owner
unlawfully takes the goods from the hirer, then the latter can sue the
owner in conversion. The hirer needs a proprietary interest in the
goods to do this. In Lee v Atkinson25 it was held that an owner could
not recover the goods at will during the term of the hiring because
the hirer had a special property against all men. That special
property could not be the special property vested in all possessors as
against strangers because the owner is not a stranger. It, therefore,
makes sense to regard the owner's proprietary right to immediate
possession as having been conveyed to the hirer when the latter
acquires possession. That right is part of full ownership; so, when it
is conveyed to the hirer, the owner's interest shrinks to a reversion.
There are, therefore, at least two types of ownership: full ownership
and reversionary ownership. Full ownership incorporates the right to
immediate possession, such as the interest of an owner who delivers
goods to a carrier or warehouse-keeper but retains the right to call
for delivery on demand. Reversionary ownership, by contrast, exists
where the proprietary right to immediate possession has been
conveyed to another person, such as a hirer or pledgee.
The hirer can, therefore, be regarded as having a limited
proprietary interest in the goods, which binds the finance company.
But, it is not an interest that is steadily swelling into full ownership.
Only the exercise of the option to purchase can transfer ownership to
22 (1796)7 TR 9.
23 See: Gordon v Harper (1796) 7 TR 9; Bloxham v Sanders (1825) 4 B & C 941; Owen v Knight
(1837) 4 Bing. (NC) 54; Wilmshurst v Bowker (1839) 5 Bing. (NC) 541; Milgate v Kebble (1841) 10
LJCP 277; and Bradley v Copely (1845) 1 CB 685.
24 See Bloxam v Sanders (1825) 4 B & C 941, P 949; Crocker v Molyneux (1828) 3 C & P 470; Melling
v Kelshaw (1830) 1 Cr & J 184, pp 187 and 189; Gillett v Hill (1834) 2 C & M 530, P 536; Owen v
Knight (1837) 4 Bing (NC) 54, p. 57; Wilmshurst v Bowker (1839) 5 Bing (NC) 541, P 551; Milgate v
Kebble (1841) 10 LJCP. 277, 278; and Bradley v Copely (1845) 1 CB 685, P 697.
25 (1609) Cro Jac 236.
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the hirer. Furthermore, it is a right that lasts for the duration of the
contractual term of the hiring. If the hirer wrongfully sells the goods,
the terms of the hiring will almost certainly decree that the hiring is
determined immediately. That means that the hirer's proprietary
interest reverts to the finance company, whose reversionary
ownership then swells to full, unencumbered ownership. To prevent
that happening, the hirer would have to plead relief from forfeiture?6
But, two points are relevant here. First, it is arguable that, where the
hire-purchase agreement is terminated by the hirer's wrongful sale,
equity will not grant relief in favour of the hirer because whoever
comes to equity must come with clean hands. Second, it is not the
hirer who will want relief from forfeiture but their buyer. How can
the buyer step in and claim to take advantage of equitable relief if
they have not taken an assignment of the hirer's option to purchase?
3. Limiting the finance company's loss by using the law of tort
In Wickham Holdings v Brooke House Motors Denning LJ was
of the opinion that the plaintiff could recover no more than they had
lost. He tried to limit their loss by regarding them as having a limited
proprietary interest in the goods. But, as we have seen, that does not
work. Another way of dealing with the matter is to invoke the
normal rules of tort. According to Denning LJ, when the finance
company sues a third party in conversion, the former can recover no
more than their loss. That is measured by the amount outstanding
under the hire-purchase agreement. But, this approach encounters a
difficulty highlighted in Chubb Cash Ltd v John Crilley & Son. 27
In that case the claimants had let a cash register on hire-
purchase terms. Bailiffs took the cash register from the hirer, who
had wrongfully declared that it belonged to him. The owners sued
the bailiffs and the Court ofAppeal decided that, despite a finding to
the contrary by the trial judge, the cash register was worth far less
than the outstanding balance under the hire-purchase contract. The
claimant (owners) then relied on Wickham Holdings v Brooke House
Motors as authority for the proposition that the claimant in such
cases was always entitled to the balance outstanding on the hire-
26 The right to claim relief from forfeiture was recognised in On Demand Information v Michael
Gerson, ante.
27 [1983] 1 WLR 599.
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purchase agreement. Both judges, Fox LJ and Bush J, disagreed,
holding that in such cases the claimant was entitled to recover no
more than whichever was the lesser sum between the value of the
goods and the outstanding balance under the hire-purchase
agreement. In the instant case the lesser sum was the value of the
goods.
In this case the reasoning of Bush J is particularly instructive.
He denied that the value outstanding on the hire-purchase contract
was the measure of the claimant's loss. Referring to that loss, he
said: "This damage does not in this case flow from the conversion,
but flows from the failure of the debtor to perform his obligations
under the [hire-purchase] agreement. ,,28 This is clearly correct in the
context of a claim in tort: it was a matter of causation. As the
defendants did not cause the claimant's loss under the hire-purchase
agreement, they should not have to make good that loss. But this
creates a contradiction in Bush J's reasoning. If the unpaid balance
under the hire-purchase agreement is not a loss caused by the third
party, then how can that sum ever be the measure of damages in tort
even if it is less than the value of the goods? It must follow that, by
using the rules of tort in such cases, the finance company's loss is
always deemed to be the value of the goods. The balance
outstanding under the hire-purchase agreement is a matter between
the finance company and the hirer. If the finance company wants to
make good its loss under that agreement, then it must sue the hirer
for breach of contract.
The heavy weight of precedent
Early in the history of hire-purchase agreements the highest
appellate court decided that those agreements should be treated
according to their own terms rather than be treated as secured sales.
What Denning LJ sought to do in Wickham Holdings v Brook House
Motors was pretend that Helby v Matthews and McEntire v Crossley
had not been decided because he treated a hire-purchase contract as
if it were in substance a secured sale. If the finance company's
interest is regarded as dwindling with each hire payment, then the
finance company must be regarded as having either a share of
ownership of the goods or a security interest in the goods. As the
2X [1983] 1 WLR 599. p 604.
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finance company and hirer are clearly not co-owners, the finance
company by default must then be regarded as having a security
interest; but, McEntire v Crossley ruled against that. None of the
attempts made in the cases to prevent the finance company from
recovering a windfall from third parties are convincing. They are all
attempts to reach a just result in spite of the established rules. There
is here a clear conflict between justice on the one hand and judicial
consistency on the other hand.
Solving the problem of over-compensation
The techniques, so far used by the lower courts to deny the
finance company a windfall at the expense of innocent third parties,
are unsound because, in an attempt to side-step binding precedent,
they are clearly at odds with well-established legal rules. If the
finance company is to be denied its windfall, and if the law is to be
coherent, then one or more of the established rules needs to be
reformed. Reform of the rules of causation in tort is out of the
question because causation is as much a matter of fact as of law and
the facts cannot be turned on their head. The defendant who is a
stranger to the hire-purchase agreement simply does not cause the
hirer's indebtedness under that agreement.
A more realistic reform would be to relax the rules regulating
the assignment of contractual rights enabling the hirer to assign their
option to purchase. This can only be achieved at common law if the
House of Lords departs from its decision in Linden Gardens v
Lenesta Sludge, which is an unlikely prospect. Alternatively,
Parliament might intervene by adopting the Australian mode1.29 This
provides that the option can be assigned, subject to the finance
company's consent, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld.
Such a reform would not be a panacea because many hirers fail to
reveal to their purchasers the existence of the hire-purchase
agreement. In such circumstances there is no scope for any express
assignment and no opportunity for the finance company to object.
A more effective way of helping the third party would be to
29 In Australia the uniform Hire-Purchase Act 1959, s 9 (Qld), s 13 (Tas), s 9 (Vic), s 9 (WA); 1960 s 9
(NSW) and s 9 (SA); 1961 s 14 (ACT) introduced the following provision: "The right, title and interest
of a hirer under a hire-purchase agreement may be assigned with the consent of the owner or, if his
consent is unreasonably withheld, without his consent." Most of these statutes have since been replaced
by later legislation.
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extend the statutory exceptions to the nemo dat rule by providing
that all bona fide purchasers of goods, subject to hire-purchase
agreements, are protected.30 However, this would still leave the hirer
without adequate protection because, towards the end of the hire
period, they might find themselves financially embarrassed and
unable to complete all hire payments. If the hirer is unable to carry
on paying, then the court will not award relief from forfeiture. The
finance company would then be able to recover the goods and keep
the sums already paid, which in reality reflect the bulk of the capital
value of the goods.
The most effective and comprehensive reform needs to look at
the very nature of hire-purchase agreements and treat them
according to their economic function, that is, secured sales rather
than the legal form adopted by the finance company. The hirer's
monthly payments should not be regarded as consideration for the
right to possess the goods but as part payment towards the
acquisition of ownership. As we have seen, in Helby v Matthews
Lord Macnaghten was of the view that the hirer had the advantage of
returning the goods if they proved unsatisfactory, without having to
pay all hire instalments due under the agreement. In other words, the
hirer could hedge their bets in a way they could not if it were a
conditional sale. But, this is scant consolation to the hirer who has
paid, say, nine-tenths of the hire instalments but cannot complete
them due to financial difficulties. In any event modem consumers
are not interested in hiring the goods; they simply want to buy them
on credit. This is emphasised by the fact that most consumers are
probably unaware that they have entered a hire-purchase agreement
rather than a conditional sale agreement. The appropriate form is put
before them by the retailer and they sign it without realising its full
legal significance.
The Crowther Committee Report on Consumer Credit of
1971 31 pointed out that hire-purchase agreements were really two
agreements rolled into one. They were sales financed by loans. The
Committee forcefully asserted that: "The notion that a hire-purchase
agreement is a hiring with an option to purchase is well recognised
30 Currently. where goods are subject to a hire-purchase agreement. only hona fide private purchasers
of motor vehicles are protected: see the Hire-Purchase Act 1964, s 27.
31 Cmnd 4596.
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as a legal fiction bearing no relation to reality. It is in truth a sale.,,32
The Committee recommended a change in the law to recognise that
"the extension of credit in a ... hire-purchase transaction is in reality
a purchase-money loan and that the reservation of title under a hire-
purchase ... agreement ... is in reality a chattel mortgage securing a
loan.,,33
The Government of the day rejected that part of the Crowther
Committee Report dealing with security interests in goods. A similar
recommendation, made by the Diamond Report of 1989 on Security
Interests in Property/4 was also not taken up. If Parliament is
reluctant to intervene, might the courts reform the law? That would
require the House of Lords' decisions in Helby v Matthews and
McEntire v Crossley to be overruled. Their Lordships have power to
depart from their own previous decisions but they are unlikely to
exercise that power in this instance because it would retrospectively
upset a long-established commercial practice. Alternatively, the
House of Lords might regard this as an exceptional case meriting the
application of prospective overruling as outlined in Re Spectrum
Plus Ltd. 35 If Spectrum itself was not regarded as an exceptional
case, then it is unlikely that their Lordships will regard hire-purchase
as exceptional. The prospects for reform, therefore, do not look rosy.
Conclusion
There is a widespread belief that the legal form of hire-
purchase agreements is a fiction. The need to prevent the finance
company from recovering the full value of the goods from
unsuspecting third parties who acquire the goods has been
recognised by the courts. Unfortunately, the techniques used by the
courts in this endeavour are unconvincing. This simply emphasises
the need for reform. Various reforms are possible but the fairest and
most effective reform would be to look at the economic function
rather than the legal form of such agreements and treat them as
secured loans rather than hirings with an option to purchase. In
.12 Ibid, para 5.2.2.
11 Ibid, para 5.2.8.i.
14 A Review alSecurity Interests in Property (Report to the Department of Trade and Industry).
15 See In Re Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 4].
35
reality this is what the lower courts have been doing but cannot
admit as much because that would run counter to the decisions of the
House of Lords in Helby v Matthews and McEntire v Crossley. The
current conservative nature of stare decisis in England and Wales
militates against the House of Lords departing from these decisions.
Our system of law-making only works well if Parliament is prepared
to reform the law when our system of rigid precedent prevents the
courts from acting. In this instance Parliament has been reluctant to
intervene. So, the courts will continue to fiddle the rules in the
interests ofjustice, but at the expense of coherence and consistency.
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